

Build and Solve a Simple General Equilibrium (GE) Model with Hicksian LES Demand using a Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP)

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Lecture developed for graduate international trade curriculum
[Link to download](#) code (with iteration)

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Exercises

- ▶ 2 representative firms, 2 representative consumers, 1 factor.
- ▶ Firms' technologies are linear with constant returns to scale.
- ▶ Consumers are modeled with linear expenditure system (LES);
- ▶ It can be easily parameterized to more general systems.
- ▶ See, e.g., [Universal CES Demands](#).

Task

Build a GE model and formulate the economy as a mathematical programming problem using an MCP, and solve it.

Model Setup

- ▶ Consider an economy with **two firms** and **two consumers**.
- ▶ Firm 1 is entirely owned by consumer 1. It produces guns (g) from oil (x) via the production function:

$$g = 2x. \tag{1}$$

- ▶ Firm 2 is entirely owned by consumer 2; it produces butter (b) from oil via the production function:

$$b = 3x. \tag{2}$$

Model Setup

- ▶ Each consumer owns **10 units** of oil.
- ▶ Consumer 1's utility function is

$$U(g, b) = g^{0.4} b^{0.6}. \quad (3)$$

- ▶ Consumer 2's utility function is

$$U(g, b) = 10 + 0.5 \ln g + 0.5 \ln b \quad (4)$$

Mechanical Solution

- ▶ Solving a GE first by hand can be handy for **several reasons**.
- ▶ First, ask **three questions**: (1) GE prices; (2) GE quantities of final goods; (3) GE input demand.
- ▶ *What are the market clearing prices for guns butter and oil?*
- ▶ Firms maximize their profits, firm 1

$$\begin{aligned} & \underset{g, x \geq 0}{\text{maximizes}} && \pi_1 = p_g g - p_x x && (5) \\ & \text{s.t.:} && g = 2x; \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ Isomorphically, firm 2

$$\begin{aligned} & \underset{g, x \geq 0}{\text{maximizes}} && \pi_2 = p_b b - p_x x && (6) \\ & \text{s.t.:} && b = 3x \end{aligned}$$

Mechanical Solution

- ▶ Both firms have production technologies that are linear with constant returns to scale (CRS), so are subject to zero profit in equilibrium.
- ▶ F.O.C. solutions with choice of numeraire: $p_x = 1$.
- ▶ $p_g = 1/2$ and $p_b = 1/3$.

Mechanical Solution

- ▶ *How many guns and how much butter does each consumer consume?*
- ▶ Both utility functions are Cobb-Douglas with convex optimization (concave objectives with linear constraints).
- ▶ So the optimal choices are share-weighted incomes divided by market-clearing prices derived earlier.
- ▶ $Q_{g,1} = 0.4 * 10 * 2 = 8$, $Q_{b,2} = 0.6 * 10 * 3 = 18$.
- ▶ $Q_{g,2} = 0.5 * 10 * 2 = 10$, $Q_{b,2} = 0.5 * 10 * 3 = 15$.

Mechanical Solution

- ▶ *How much oil does each firm use?*
- ▶ In market equilibrium, total output for guns and butter equals total consumptions that are produced by firm 1 and firm 2.
- ▶ That is, 18 units of gun, and 33 units of butter.
- ▶ Plugging them back into each firm's production function, we get the input requirements.
- ▶ $Q_{x,1} = 9$ and $Q_{x,2} = 11$.

Mechanical Solution

Consider a closed-economy GE framework with one intersectorally mobile factor L and two output (G and S).

The Stone-Geary form (LES): $e(\vec{p}, u) = p_G \bar{G} + Up_G^\alpha p_S^{1-\alpha}$,

where \bar{G} in this representation is a “subsistence” or minimum level of goods consumption.

- ▶ One may use Shephard's Lemma to derive the Hicksian demand functions for G and S .
- ▶ **The Hicksian demand:** $h(\vec{p}, u) = \nabla_p e(\vec{p}, u)$.
- ▶ $X_G(\vec{p}, w) \equiv h_G(\vec{p}, u) = \bar{G} + \alpha Up_G^{\alpha-1} p_S^{1-\alpha}$.
- ▶ $X_S(\vec{p}, w) \equiv h_S(\vec{p}, u) = (1 - \alpha) Up_G^\alpha p_S^{-\alpha}$

Dual Relationship and Roy's Identity

If consumers were given an additional dollar of income, how would they allocate it across the two goods?

- ▶ By the duality theory and money metric utility identity:

$$U \equiv V(\vec{p}, e(\vec{p}, U)) = V(\vec{p}, w) = \frac{w - p_G \bar{G}}{p_G^\alpha p_S^{1-\alpha}}. \quad (7)$$

- ▶ Using Roy's Identity:

$$\begin{aligned} x_G &= -\frac{\partial V / \partial p_G}{\partial V / \partial w} = (1 - \alpha) \bar{G} + \alpha \frac{w}{p_G} \\ x_S &= -\frac{\partial V / \partial p_S}{\partial V / \partial w} = (\alpha - 1) \frac{p_G}{p_S} \bar{G} + (1 - \alpha) \frac{w}{p_S}. \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

Build a GE Model

- ▶ (1) Zero-profit equation for welfare.
- ▶ (2) Zero-profit equation for G and S.
- ▶ (3) Market-clearing for aggregate demand.
- ▶ (4) Market-clearing for G and S.
- ▶ (5) Market-clearing for labor.
- ▶ (6) Income definition.

Exogenous Environment

These are the **data** that we need to collect and **fixed parameters** that we need to estimate or sometimes get elsewhere.

- ▶ (1) Labor endowment (L): 100.
- ▶ (2) Subsistence consumption (Γ_i): $\bar{G} = 40$ and $\bar{S} = 0$.
- ▶ (3) Fixed parameters: $\alpha_G = 1/6$ and $\alpha_S = 1 - \alpha_G$.
- ▶ (4) Define: ω is the labor wage per unit of goods.
- ▶ (5) Define: M as income.
- ▶ (6) Define: PU as the price index. It can be derived by solving the marginal income of utility in the optimization problem, and then substitute the expression into the LES **Hicksian** expenditure function.

Corresponding Mixed Complementarity Conditions

▶ (1)

$$\prod_i p_i \alpha_i \geq PU \quad \perp \quad u \geq 0.$$

▶ (2)

$$\alpha_i \omega_i \geq p_i \quad \perp \quad X_i \geq 0.$$

▶ (3)

$$PU = (M - \sum_i \Gamma_i) / U.$$

▶ (4)

$$X_i \geq \Gamma_i + \alpha_i U(PU) / p_i \quad \perp \quad p_i \geq 0.$$

▶ (5)

$$L \geq \sum_i \alpha_i X_i \quad \perp \quad \omega \geq 0.$$

▶ (6)

$$M = \omega L.$$